Nukes

Fresh sanctions on a cash-poor North Korean regime could help cause exactly the situation we hope to prevent -- nuclear proliferation.

By Charles D. Ferguson

It's hard not to be a bit anxious about the news, reported Thursday, that North Korea might launch a ballistic missile toward Hawaii next month. But the United States and its partners should resist the urge to panic. North Korea's nuclear and long-range missile capabilities are rudimentary and will likely remain so for years to come. (Pyongyang's long-range missiles won't likely reach all the way to Hawaii, given their record of failure. Kim Jong Il instead might be trying to send a message to President Obama, who was born and grew up in Hawaii.) In fact, the only thing to fear is literally fear itself: If severe economic sanctions are imposed on North Korea, they could result in the plausible worst case scenario of North Korea selling nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear materials abroad.

As it stands today, North Korea cannot credibly threaten the United States with a nuclear attack from a ballistic missile or aircraft. The long-range Taepo Dong missile may someday have the reliable capability to hit the continental United States. But the two failed tests in recent years show that at least a few more trial runs would be needed to work out the technical kinks. Besides, the Taepo Dong is not likely to be able to carry its 500 kilogram payload, a first-generation nuclear warhead, over an intercontinental distance. Nor does North Korea have a long-range aircraft that could drop a nuclear bomb on the United States.

Moreover, North Korea has yet to develop a reliable, high-yield nuclear weapon. The country's first test, in October 2006, produced an explosion that fell far short of the four-kilotons that North Korea told China it expected. (And even four kilotons would pale in comparison to the 20-kiloton plutonium-based bomb that fell on Nagasaki in 1945.) Many analysts believe North Korea's second nuclear test last month was more successful, at an estimated yield of two to four kilotons. This might tell us that North Korea is seeking to build low-yield nuclear weapons, stretching out its limited plutonium stockpile. The country might have enough fissile material for three to eight nuclear bombs of the Nagasaki design or somewhat more than double that number at lower yields.

North Korea is stuck with its current stockpile of plutonium for at least another several months, because it will take that long to repair the disabled reactor at Yongbyon. Even then, Yongbyon can only make about one bomb's worth of plutonium each year. And though North Korea recently shocked the world by admitting to having a uranium enrichment program, it will likely take years to produce large quantities of weapons-usable material.

Of course, the relatively rudimentary nature of North Korea's nuclear arsenal does not call for complacency. In the region in particular, North Korea does pose a serious threat to both South Korea and Japan. Seoul is in striking range of thousands of North Korean artillery tubes, and Pyongyang has repeatedly warned of its ability to turn the South into a "sea of fire." Yet such a scenario is unlikely so long as the United States remains committed to defending South Korea and Japan, as the Obama administration has reaffirmed that it is.

The greatest concern is that North Korea could sell nuclear and missile capabilities to other states or perhaps non-state actors. Already, North Korea has sold several hundred million dollars worth of missiles to Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Vietnam, and Yemen, in recent years, and it helped Syria build a nuclear reactor that was intended for plutonium production. (In September 2007, Israel bombed this construction site.) Facing dire economic conditions, North Korea certainly has a strong motivation to profit from its only expertise.

As far as we know, North Korea has refrained from selling its nuclear weapons and materials to other states or non-state actors. But should harsh financial sanctions be imposed, the country might feel compelled to do exactly that. That prospect has thus far been held off by China, which, fearing North Korea's collapse, has prevented the U.N. Security Council from imposing truly tough sanctions or authorizing the use of force. That might be a blessing in disguise -- and save the world from its own worst nuclear fears.

Charles D. Ferguson is Philip D. Reed senior fellow for science and technology at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and project director of the CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force Report on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, chaired by William J. Perry and Brent Scowcroft.

KIM JAE-HWAN/AFP/Getty Images

Iran's nuclear program is cause for concern, but not for the reasons you think.

By Jacqueline Shire

There are plenty of reasons to pay close attention to Iran's nuclear progress, but the new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report showing that the country has accumulated 1010 kg of low-enriched uranium is not at the top of my list.

That's not to say that this milestone is insignificant. We now know that Iran has accumulated enough low-enriched uranium (LEU) to yield sufficient high-enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon should Iran decide to seize the material, which is under IAEA safeguards, further enrich it, and in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, use the material in a nuclear warhead. Luckily, given the international crisis this action would certainly provoke, Iran is unlikely to attempt the feat.

We've also learned that Iran has achieved its objective of successfully operating several thousand centrifuges. This has been a gradual process that began in earnest two years ago.

The report generated further concern because of a discrepancy in the accounting of Iran's uranium. According to senior U.N. officials, the discrepancy, which resulted in the underreporting of LEU in the November 2008 report by 209 kg, was an engineering miscalculation on Iran's part and not a deliberate attempt to mislead the IAEA. The net effect is that Iran crossed the so-called breakout threshold a few months earlier than expected. 

While legitimate cause for worry, these headlines obscure other equally important developments. One is that although Iran has installed upwards of 5,400 centrifuges, it continues to operate just under 4,000 of them, bringing into operation only one additional cascade of centrifuges since November. Is Iran suddenly more attuned to the optics of its nuclear program? Hard to say, especially given that it continues to stonewall the IAEA on access to a heavy water reactor under construction at Arak, and refuses to even discuss a set of documents that allegedly show research into nuclear warhead design.

Potentially more troubling is Iran's refusal to allow IAEA inspection of nuclear facilities not covered under traditional safeguards, in particular places where centrifuges are manufactured and stored. The consequence is that the IAEA has little knowledge of how many centrifuges Iran is manufacturing and where they are. It is conceivable therefore that Iran could make centrifuges that are not destined for the inspected site at Natanz, but for a clandestine facility. Because of another change that Iran unilaterally made to its safeguards relationship with the IAEA, it has declared that it will only inform the IAEA of new nuclear facilities six months before they become operational.

These are the fine-print details of Iran's relationship with Vienna that don't garner flashy headlines, but are the real reason to keep a close eye on Iran's actions. 

Jacqueline Shire is a senior analyst at the Institute for Science and International Security and a widely cited expert on Iran's nuclear program.

Photo: Majid Saeedi/Getty Images