Some Middle East wars create breakthroughs for peace; Gaza won't.
By Aaron David Miller
Those who believe in the peace process tooth fairy may hope that, after Israel gives Hamas a good whack, the prospects for serious negotiations will improve, particularly under a more committed Obama administration. This isn't likely in the near term.
Israel's prerequisite for ending the conflict with the Palestinians -- a reformed or weakened Hamas or an emboldened Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, ready to meet Israel's needs and requirements -- is now more elusive than ever. As long as the Palestinian house remains divided, with Hamas strong and Abbas weak, the chances of a conflict-ending Israeli-Palestinian agreement are slim to none. Should Hamas survive its war with Israel in Gaza, such an agreement will remain more elusive than ever.
Beyond the tick tock of the current fighting lies an undeniable reality: only a political deal will end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And right now there are many obstacles standing in the way, including divisions within Israel and big gaps between the parties on the conflict's core issues: borders, refugees, and the future of Jerusalem, among others.
But looming largest is the crisis that confronts the Palestinian national movement. It is a badly shattered humpty-dumpty -- two polities, two armies, two ideologies, two sets of patrons -- and putting it back together again does not look hopeful. Nor do the prospects for fostering the unity Palestinians require to negotiate with Israel, monopolize the use of violence in their society, or even struggle successfully for a Palestinian state.
Without a unified Palestinian house, what Israeli Prime Minister would make existential concessions to a Palestinian leader who doesn't control all the guns? And what Palestinian leader could even begin to make the kinds of concessions that peace with Israel will require without the authority and legitimacy that derives from the support of most Palestinians? At present, if Israel wants peace and quiet for its southern towns and cities or the return of its kidnapped soldier, Gilad Shalit, it goes to Hamas not to Abbas. And yet Israel and the United States look to Abbas to deliver a political settlement.
Pressing Hamas to recognize Israel's right to exist and abandon terror and violence are reasonable and legitimate. But Israel should have no illusions here. It took Israel and Fatah, the secular manifestation of Palestinian nationalism, almost thirty years to work out a modus vivendi, which is still only in its preliminary phase. Indeed, many in Fatah still question Israel's identity as a Jewish state and support armed struggle. So how long might it take Israel and Hamas, the religious manifestation of Palestinian nationalism?
The current war will only lengthen this timeline. In the wake of the death and devastation caused by the ongoing fighting, Palestinian anger (both in Gaza and the West Bank) is likely to be directed at Israel, the United States, Abbas, and only then at Hamas. The Hezbollah precedent is far from perfect, but if Hamas survives the full brunt of an Israeli assault and emerges still capable of launching rockets into Israel, this would be a tremendous victory. Hamas' power and prestige will likely grow. And it can always count on the combination of Abbas's fecklessness, Israeli settlement and occupation practices, and the U.S. bias toward Israel to help it maintain its relevance and influence.
With apologies to Yeats, one has to wonder in the wake of the Gaza war, what new and nasty beast is slouching toward Bethlehem waiting to be born.
Aaron David Miller, a former Middle East negotiator under Republican and Democratic administrations, is a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and author of The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace.
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