Why sanctions won't work

Tue, 03/03/2009 - 4:12pm

Economic sanctions haven't been able to stop human rights abuses and they won't stop Iran's nuclear program.

By Dursun Peksen

After some encouraging early signs of greater diplomatic engagement between the United States and Iran, there are now renewed calls for the Barack Obama administration to get tough with the Islamic Republic. Typically, "getting tough" means yet another round of sanctions. A new report, whose authors include senior Obama advisors Dennis Ross and Gary Samore, recommends a range of new sanctions to deter Iran's nuclear program. Last week, France, Germany, and Britain drew up a list of Iranian targets for new sanctions, seemingly designed to give Obama a "big stick" to wield as he moves into negotiations.

It's a stick Obama should think twice about using. Economic sanctions not only typically fail to induce authoritarian regimes to change their policies, but they are also counterproductive tools that deteriorate human rights conditions in the sanctioned countries. The Obama administration would be more likely to accomplish its goals for Iran and other regimes by lifting sanctions and seeking an alternative, noncoercive policy as part of a greater strategy of engagement.

The recent history of sanctions against Iran-as well as against countries such as Cuba, North Korea, Burma, and Zimbabwe-shows that rather than putting pressure on leaders to capitulate to U.S. demands, economic sanctions typically consolidate the coercive authority of authoritarian governments. Savvy leaders are able to use economic sanctions as a strategic tool for manipulating access to the resources that the sanctions regime makes scarce. By doing this they simultaneously enhance their authority and weaken the opposition's ability to mobilize against the regime.

Foreign economic pressures also create incentives for authoritarian leaders to become more repressive toward opposition groups in order to preserve their hold on power. They often surmise that conceding to foreign pressure would make them look weak domestically and might result in the loss of their legitimacy and popular support. To mitigate any possible domestic costs caused by concessions to external economic pressure, authoritarian leaders have greater incentive to be less conciliatory to coercive threats and put greater pressure on opposition groups to demonstrate their resolve.

My research into the effect sanctions have on human rights conditions in authoritarian regimes shows that more abuses typically occur with sanctions in place and that the number of abuses is greater when sanctions regimes are more extensive. If sanctions can't pressure Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe into respecting the political rights of his people, why should they deter Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from seeking a nuclear weapon?

Thankfully, sanctions are not the only option. An alternative course of action in the form of engagement-dialogue, regular diplomatic communications, and economic incentives such as foreign aid and/or provisions of low-interest loans-might be more effective in advancing human rights, democracy, and, in Iran's case, cooperation with international nuclear protocols. These policies will be less costly to those groups seeking greater rights and political reform, and make target regimes more conciliatory toward external demands.

There are promising early signs that the Obama administration might be favoring such an approach. In her four-country tour of Asia last month, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hinted at reviewing the economic sanctions against Burma, which has been ruled by a military junta for more than two decades. Clinton admitted publicly that the sanctions against Burma had virtually no impact on weakening the military regime. Similarly, with a new power-sharing deal and the formation of a unity government in Zimbabwe, the African Union recently urged the United States and other Western countries to lift the harsh economic sanctions against the country.

A plan of engagement that includes the lifting of sanctions would be the best possible way of helping these long-suffering countries move toward more political freedom. In the case of Iran, it might just prevent a nuclear showdown.

Dursun Peksen is assistant professor of political science at East Carolina University. His research interests focus on foreign policy, international political economy, and, in particular, economic sanctions.

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I don't believe sanctions are

I don't believe sanctions are the most effective tool to influence rouge regimes, and I generally agree with Peksen's conclusions. However, his argument is far too broad and lacks subtlety. First, there is a difference between using sanctions in order to influence a regime's behavior, as opposed to trying to overthrowing a regime. In the latter case, the government has no incentive to meet the conditions of the sanctions because doing so would remove it from power. In the former, a government could very well feel compelled to give up an important nuclear program if it believed its regime would benefit more through increased trade than a nuclear bomb. Thus, it is actually very easy to see why sanctions "could" push Iran to give up the bomb, but would be utterly ineffective in convincing Mugabe to give up power (and risk subjecting himself to prosecution or retaliation for his human rights abuses).

Another important question is whether the sanctions are unilateral or multilateral. Particularly important is whether the target country's neighbors uphold the sanctions or undermine them. Sanctions against South Africa worked in large part because they were supported not only by the UN, but also by most of southern Africa and the apartheid regime's main trading partners.

While I think at this point we ought to at least try engaging Iran, the use of sanctions does depend upon the context.

Peksen also needs a better fact-checker. Burma has been under military rule for 47 years, not 20.

Dom

bombons, vs sanction

As Ali-G inquired of Baker, "ain't it about carrots, and sticks?"

Let's embargo them, and then bomb a few crates of carrots?

By the way, I think sanctions can work - they just need to be airtight. You can't sanction to the detriment of your industry.

Wider solution

Nothing will prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons while Israel possess them.

Also, considering the US force next door and partial encirclement by US naval forces.

It's not a crazy response, it's rational. Once Iran has nukes, no one will attack on a large scale or try to invade.

The only way out of this is a verifiable regional nuclear disarmament agreement, which includes Israel turning over its nukes to the US (which actually is paying for them).

Why sanctions won't work

Most governments have set criteria for "smart" sanctions to be effective, and it is the failure to meet these criteria through premature action based more on emotion than careful analysis which explains why they so often fail. In the case of Burma, there never was a chance that they would work, because the military regime regards those imposing sanctions as neo-imperialists bent on recolonising the country whose unity and stability to them is much more important than the economic well-being of its citizens. As a result, the more sanctions have been tightened, the more entrenched, recalcitrant and isolated the regime has become. In these cicumstances sanctions are not merely ineffective. They are positively counterproductive and result in increased human rights abuses.

It has not helped that the iconic and charismatic Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has ever since 1989 called for sanctions, which has firmly set her in the neo-imperialist camp in the eyes of the military regime, and thus made her an enemy of the State.

Dursun Pehsen is correct to say that the present military junta in Burma has been in power for over two decades (only). The military junta which took over on 18 September 1988 did so through a military coup as a result of which many scores, perhaps hundreds were killed (quite apart from the three thousand or more who died in the Uprising during the previous month). The previous Burma Socialist Programme Party administration may have been strongly influenced, even dominated by the military, but it was a constitutional government (of sorts) elected on the model of East European popular democracies with a functioning civilian cabinet, not an unconstitutional "junta" ruling directly. I feel sure Dursun Pehsen was cautious and precise when he used the word "junta".

The way Peksen described the

The way Peksen described the junta in Burma made it sound like it has been under a military regime for 20 years. While Derek is correct in saying that the previous socialist government was patterned on Eastern European countries, it nonetheless had a strong military element. The socialist government came to power in a military coup, its senior leaders were military men, and was not constitutional in any sense of the word. In fact ruled for almost a decade (1962-74) before adopting a socialist constitution. Regardless, anyone who studies Burma seriously would note that the country has been under a military dictatorship in some form or another since 1962. Peksen would have been precise by breaking down the history as Derek does, but going only back to 1988 vastly understates the roots of authoritarian rule in Burma and the depth of the problems the country faces.