Gates's defense deja vu

Posted By Winslow Wheeler Share

Why a so-called sweeping overhaul of defense spending is actually just more of the same.

By Winslow Wheeler

Just as it has consumed the press, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's decisions on hardware will completely preoccupy Congress. A major food fight is sure to break out over the capping of F-22 production at 187 very expensive, but not particularly impressive, fighter jets.

If Gates's defense budget proposal is approved, there will be no new presidential or search-and-rescue helicopters (for now) and no more C-17 cargo planes. Pork-hungry members of Congress are sure to object. Although the secretary promised increases in intelligence capabilities and many other things (including 50 new Predator and Reaper drones, accelerated F-35 aircraft production, and more), these projects will not be nearly enough to satiate those eager to "plus up" their congressional districts.

While Washington hisses and spits over the secretary's hardware recommendations, it is probably more important to ask what has changed. And if anything has, where are U.S. defense priorities now headed?

From a budget perspective, it does not appear that the basic Department of Defense budget has changed; this set of decisions may be budget-neutral, or it may even hold in its future expanded net spending requirements.

Nor does Gates's announcement reorder defense spending away from occupations in foreign lands (the advocates call it "counterinsurgency") or change the fact that the United States will continue to spend most of its defense budget on forms of conventional warfare most reminiscent of the mid-20th century. To fight the indistinct, unspecified conflicts that the United States may face in the foreseeable future, neither the strategy nor the hardware has changed.

For example, the Army can now expect a choice between 30-year-old heavily armored vehicles or new but inadequately armored Strykers and MRAPs. Some in the Navy is puzzled over the continued budgetary fixation with aircraft carriers when what's needed is an effective design of an affordable frigate, or littoral combat ship.

Although today's budget proposal means that many decisions were made, the Pentagon ship of state appears to be very much on the same basic course. The problematic nation-building strategy that mired the United States in Kosovo, Iraq, and now Afghanistan is fundamentally unchanged, and the thinking that buys only a shrinking, aging weapons inventory at increasing cost remains alive and well, just slightly different in appearance.

Examples of business as usual are easy to find. The Pentagon's acquisition system is abysmally inefficient and unable to produce effective weapons at affordable cost, but the secretary's endorsement of the "procurement reform" bill sponsored by Sens. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.) means that nothing much will change there. Reasonable-sounding provisions that were actually riddled with subtle loopholes were even more watered down at the Defense Department's urging. The bill, if passed, will do nothing to fix the system. Instead, there will be some new bottles for some very old wine, but the bitter taste will remain as the United States rushes to build untested aircraft (e.g., the F-35) and spend generously to defend against less -- not more -- likely threats (e.g., missile defense).

There is one set of decisions, even if they are unspectacular, for which Gates deserves much good credit. He promised "to reaffirm [the country's] commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, which, in my view represents America's greatest strategic asset." Hopefully, that rhetoric was not just rhetorical. The secretary placed a strong emphasis on medical research, caring for the wounded, and family support. The danger moving forward is that Congress will do little more on this fundamental issue than simply throw money at it -- as it has in the past.

Winslow Wheeler is director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information.

Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

 
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FJT1978

3:17 PM ET

April 7, 2009

The "not particularly impressive" F-22

I'm not clear on why the author described the F-22 as "not particularly impressive". Everything I have read or viewed about this aircraft indicates that nothing flies that can go toe to toe with it. Not even close! Over the Bering Strait the Russians turn tail as soon as they realize that aircraft we have deployed to counter their attempts at penetrating our airspace is the Raptor.

I would submit that if the cost of avoiding a confrontation with an adversarial air force is the cost of a number of well-placed squadrons of F-22's its well worth that cost. Unless someone can offer specifics as to why the F-22 is "not particularly impressive," I would think it is well worth the admittedly expensive investment.

The F-35 does not utilize the same power plant as the F-22 and it's performance profile, although well worth the investment, is not in the same ballpark as the Raptor's. The fact is, we will sell the F-35 to our allies in addition to being our premier multi-role tactical aircraft. It will pay for itself. It is also badly needed by both the USAF and USN for different reasons. However, it will not be an air superiority aircraft unless it flies against older versions of our opponents current air superiority forces.

I'm not advocating going out and buying multiple air wings of Raptors in the next fiscal year. However, the technological advances we make over time can be more easily assessed and implemented on an active duty aircraft that can be upgraded over its lifecycle vice returning to the drawing board to re-design entire new models of air superiority aircraft.

We should continue to purchase the Raptor over a time line that will allow continuing development of new technologies while keeping the USAF the supreme air force on the planet.

Sec'y Gates was hired by President Obama to do just what he is doing with DOD budget and defense procurement. Hard choices must be made. The very expensive F-22 is a two generation jump in tactical aircraft technology that affords the USAF complete superiority in the air. That cost is a result of that very technology. It would be foolhardy to discontinue a program that affords the USAF such a complete advantage.

 

BRETT

9:41 AM ET

April 8, 2009

I would submit that if the

I would submit that if the cost of avoiding a confrontation with an adversarial air force is the cost of a number of well-placed squadrons of F-22's its well worth that cost. Unless someone can offer specifics as to why the F-22 is "not particularly impressive," I would think it is well worth the admittedly expensive investment.

Exactly. This kind of air superiority is worth enormous cost, because it means that less of your pilots get killed (since enemy air forces are almost too intimidated to even challenge you, much less fight and win), and you can get complete air control, which is crucial in modern warfare.

 

BRETT

9:44 AM ET

April 8, 2009

spend generously to defend

spend generously to defend against less -- not more -- likely threats (e.g., missile defense).

Are you crazy? Missile technology (particularly ballistic missile technology) has become so cheap and widespread that even impoverished, Stalinesque societies like North Korea can build them. At the same time, you see the Chinese doing things like buying up missiles that could be used to counter US carrier groups in the advent of a war over Taiwan, and many other regimes rushing to get their hands on this type of thing.

That makes Missile Defense absolutely crucial in the 21st century to American security. If we can develop solid ABM, then all the potential enemies with missile technology will have to resort to other methods of assault, none of which are as cheap or versatile. The Iranians, for example, might be able to build missiles to carry nuclear warheads, but it is much less likely that they can build long-range bombers if ABM makes missile technology much less valuable.

 

ASOVIAK

2:44 PM ET

April 8, 2009

There is a significant

There is a significant difference between theater missile defense and a strategic anti-ballistic missile defense. Patriots work well and good against SCUDs, but not so well against faster, higher flying, ICBM's with advanced countermeasures (stealth, chaff, maneuver, dummy warheads), and potentially multiple warheads. Try and beat missile command and you get the idea.

An entirely different problem with missile defense is that it undermines Mutually Assured Destruction. A second order effect could be a very expensive arms race, both in terms of ABM defensive shields, and arsenals to penetrate those shields.

Of course, we could always share/sell that technology, could we not?

 

BRETT

10:26 PM ET

April 8, 2009

An entirely different problem

An entirely different problem with missile defense is that it undermines Mutually Assured Destruction. A second order effect could be a very expensive arms race, both in terms of ABM defensive shields, and arsenals to penetrate those shields.

First, MAD is a joke of a strategy. The only reason we consider it viable is because we got lucky during the Cold War; there are at least 8 openly revealed incidents (including "Able Archer" and others) where the US and Soviets almost came to a nuclear exchange. That's not counting any un-revealed instances. I don't particularly want to leave US security in the hands of luck, particularly with ballistic missile technology getting better, cheaper, and more widespread.

Second, that arms race is good from the US point of view. We ,and probably the other "responsible" nuclear states, can afford to build things like bomber fleets, which can be called back at the last minute from strikes (meaning there's more control). Many of the parties we're concerned about - the North Koreans, the Iranians, among others - don't have the technology, skill base, industry, and so forth to build that kind of thing. Drastically weakening the viability of missile-delivered nukes for these states means that there is less of an incentive to get a serious nuclear deterrent, slowing proliferation.

Of course, we could always share/sell that technology, could we not?

I'm all for it. I'd spread ABM technology as fast and widespread as possible, for the reasons I listed above. At the same time, of course, I'd put massive efforts into building a major bomber fleet, as well as other methods (like subs).

 
January/February 2010